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FOREWORD 
This validity of the positive effects of liberalisation on growth had become 
questionable in the light of the recent wave of crises, inequality and social unrest in 
many parts of the less developed third world. This study aims to shed some light on 
the ambiguity that is present on these issues.  
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THE IMPACTS OF TRADE LIBERALISATION ON DEVELOPMENT 
ECONOMIES – A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
 
 
 
N. Evrim ÖNAL 
 
 
This study investigates how the development economies of different regions react 
to liberalisation reforms by using panel data sets constructed of economic 
indicators of Latin American, African and East Asian countries. Through the 
analysis of multiple econometric models outlining the progress of development, 
external trade balance and income inequality, the validity of the paradigm of 
liberalisation is questioned. The findings indicate that the effects of trade 
liberalisation are various across regions, and this variety is caused by the 
structural differences of economies.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study is to examine and evaluate the impacts of liberalisation reforms 
on the economies of the developing countries of Latin America and Africa. For this 
purpose, a panel data set for 31 countries will be analysed to define the effects of 
liberalisation on economic growth, external trade balance and income inequality.  
Liberalisation policies have been introduced by Bretton-Woods agencies as an 
alternative to the import substitution policies after the oil crisis of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s caused the debt problems of the third world countries to deteriorate into 
insolvency. It was then claimed that liberalisation reforms would provide the needed 
stimulation to solve the general stagnation problem in these economies by attracting 
foreign direct investment and raising the external trade balance. The chief reason to 
this has been the extraordinary success of the East Asian economies after trade 
liberalisation reforms.  
However, the results were not as optimistic as they were expected to be. While the 
servicing of the external debt has been steadier after the implementation of these 
reforms, the wave of liberalisation in the developing world did not cause any serious 
improvement that would parallel the success of East Asian countries. By the end of 
the 1990s, most of the East Asian countries have progressed enough to be classified as 
developed while the reformers of Africa and Latin America still had to cope with slow 
or stagnating growth, external trade deficits and unfair distribution of income across 
their populations.  
The studies done in this field show various results concerning the effect of 
liberalisation on growth. This variety is mainly because of the difference between the 
definitions and indicators of liberalisation and country samples used in these studies. 
This study suggests that using a complete set of reforming countries in a panel 
context, while being an easier way to achieve a high level of meaning in the 
econometric models, does not distinguish the regional differences. When the fact of 
unequal achievement of growth between regional clusters is considered, this approach 
seems inadequate to define the differences that cause this problem. 
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This is the reason of the comparative nature of this study. The panel data set 
constructed for the models in this paper consists of 17 Latin American and 14 African 
countries that underwent liberalisation reforms, while another sample of 7 East Asian 
countries is used as a control group. These three sub-samples will be analysed 
together and separately to distinguish the effects of liberalisation across regions. It is 
expected that this approach, while causing serious serial correlation problems due to 
the similar nature of countries that constitute the sub-samples, would provide the 
means to identify the reasons of the different responses developing economies give to 
liberalisation reforms. 
The structure of the rest of this study is as follows: Chapter 2 outlines the progress of 
the international economy that led to the problems to which liberalisation policies 
were offered as the solution, summarizes the direction of progress after the reforms, 
and presents a review of the current literature on the subject. Chapter 3 constructs and 
analyses the model to investigate the impacts of liberalisation on economic growth. 
Chapter 4 constructs a similar model to investigate the impacts of liberalisation on 
external trade balance. Chapter 5 investigates the progress of inequality after trade 
liberalisation reforms and Chapter 6 presents the conclusions. 
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2. THE BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE OF LIBERALISATION 
2.1 Historical and Global Background of Liberalisation 
A careful evaluation of the historical facts that led to the implementation of the 
liberalisation reforms will be helpful in drawing logical conclusions from the 
empirical results derived from econometric analyses. The liberalisation did not start in 
most of the third world countries as a part of voluntary reform programs. In most 
cases, it was a introduced in the debt-relief programs of the Bretton-Woods agencies 
after the oil and debt crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
2.1.1 The Years of Import Substitution and Debt Crisis 
The controversial subject of the impacts on trade liberalisation on various areas of 
economic performance has been debated since most of the developing countries 
abandoned import substitution policies and made reforms that reduced anti-export 
bias. 
In the years after the Second World War, prior to the wide acceptance of the open 
trade paradigm, most of the developing countries were pursuing import substitution 
policies. The idea of import substitution was that the achievement of industrialisation 
was the most important goal in a developing economy. Through industrialisation, 
these economies, most of which were agricultural, sought to produce domestically the 
high value-added goods that they could only import at that time. To achieve this goal, 
many policies that imposed restrictions on trade were imposed, high tariff rates, 
quantitative restrictions on key tradable sectors and usage of multiple exchange rates 
was common.  
The main shortcoming of import substitution policy, which brought about its collapse 
and abandonment, was that it could not have been pursued indefinitely. Import 
substitution policies reallocated the resources in the economy in the favour of import 
competing sectors, and export stagnated. Industrialisation reforms under import 
substitution were financed by foreign debt, which was abundant in the conjuncture of 
that era. It was thought that the growth of foreign debt stock was to be reversed when 
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the import competing producers would themselves become exporting producers after 
an initial period of protection. 
However, the flow of foreign currency ran out before that. The international finance 
took its greatest blow since the great depression with the oil crises and the collapse of 
Bretton-Woods system. In a reversal of policies, industrial countries, the creditors of 
the import substitution policies, demanded the servicing of the debts. This brought 
about the debt crisis in the third world, which started in the late 1970s and persisted 
into the second half of the 1980s. Most of the developing countries, especially those 
in Latin America, did not have sufficient reserves and an adequately developed 
industry to back up the debt servicing required. This era was characterised by inflation 
rates that were surpassed only in the time of the Second World War, negative rates of 
growth and complete stagnation of the real sectors due to the lack of funds for 
investments and rapidly escalating in the price of energy.  
Most of the countries that had difficulties (or, in some cases, impossibilities) in 
servicing their debt turned to international organizations for assistance.       
The basic creditor strategy has had three key elements (Gilpin, 1987): (1) a 
combination of banks, governments and international organizations has acted as 
lender of last resort and provided liquidity to a debtor while the rescheduling of the 
debt has been negotiated, (2) the debtor has been required to accept a severe 
adjustment or austerity program, and (3) although other actors and institutions such as 
Federal Reserve and Paris Club of creditor nations have played important roles, the 
IMF has been given primary responsibility for enforcing adjustments based on 
principle of conditionality and for certifying eligibility for financial assistance. 
The first programs introduced by the IMF did not require extensive reforms. Most 
were mainly composed of austerity and privatisation policies that targeted the 
servicing of the debt as quickly as possible. By 1985, the financial crises of most of 
the debtor nations, particularly of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, the three most in 
indebted countries at that time, had deteriorated into insolvency, and it was evident 
that some form of systematic and international solution was required instead of a 
case-by-case forcing of debt service.  
The annual meeting of the IMF – World Bank in Seoul, Republic of Korea, in 
October 1985 came up with the solution called Baker plan. The plan proposed a three-
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way bargain among the debtors, the creditors nations and the large commercial banks 
in order to reach a solution through economic growth rather than through austerity. 
The debtors would take steps to open their economies to trade and foreign direct 
investment, reduce the role of the state in the economy through privatisation and 
adopt supply-side market oriented policies. The creditor nations would stimulate their 
economies and open them to debtor exports, enlarge the role of the World Bank in 
assisting the debtors, and increase debtor financing, especially for the poorest (mainly 
African) countries. The commercial banks would provide credit to the debtors in order 
to facilitate the shift to the new policies and increase the overall rate of economic 
growth (Gilpin, 1987). 
There were, however, some countries, which came out of the debt-crisis era of 1970s 
and 1980s relatively unscathed. These were the prodigal developing nations of East 
Asia.  
The main difference between East Asian developing nations and the others were the 
composition and nature of production. While most of the developing countries in the 
rest of the world had relied on external financing for the import-substituting industrial 
reform and agriculture for exports, the East Asian countries, mostly by following the 
Japanese example, had managed to create a manufacturing sector that produced high 
value-added goods at a cost that was relatively lower than the world market. When the 
oil crisis came, these countries managed to cut their oil consumptions and supply their 
manufactures into the world market at prices that were lower than the international 
average. Exploiting their industrial advantages, they achieved an export boom that 
carried them through the years of global recession with high export revenues, had no 
problems servicing their debts and were rewarded with an average yearly growth rate 
of 8.55 in the 1970s and 7.15 in the 1980s. 
These countries provided an example for both the creditors and debtors when the 
Baker plan was negotiated at the capital city of one of the most successful among 
them. Among many other similarities, they had one thing in common. All of them had 
abandoned import-substitution long ago and now acted under liberal market 
conditions. 
The Baker plan brought about the unilateral liberalisation of most of the third world, 
particularly Latin American countries. World Bank provided these countries with 
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Structural Adjustment Lendings (SALs), IMF provided necessary, albeit sometimes 
insufficient, credit through standby agreements and the new paradigm in the 
international economics was defined. 
2.1.2 The New Paradigm: Liberalisation 
Although the indicators and measuring of the phenomenon do not have an exact 
definition, liberalisation generally means a deregulation of trade and financial 
markets. This usually involves the reduction of tariff rates, removal of quantitative 
trade restrictions and trade prohibitions, employment of a single exchange rate regime 
where the exchange rates are defined by financial market conditions, privatisation of 
state-held sectors, particularly those that are among the tradable sectors, the removal 
of all subventions to export sectors and adherence to the international anti-dumping 
codes. 
The rationale of liberalisation suggests that, by opening the domestic economy to 
international market, a country utilizes its resources and comparative advantages in 
the most rational way by selective specialization and exploits scale economies by 
supplying to a worldwide market (Krueger, 1998, Choksi, Michaely, and 
Papageorgiou, 1991, Sachs and Warner, 1995, Dean, Desai and Riedel, 1994). 
Besides, it suggests that the national advantages of developing countries, particularly 
the abundance of natural resources and cheap labor attracts foreign direct investment, 
which creates technology transfer and stimulates growth.  
This rationale is a cause for much controversial debate itself. The antithesis (Amin, 
1996, Hirst and Thompson, 1996, Hanson and Harrigan, 1999) argues that opening 
the financial markets draws speculative capital much more than foreign direct 
investment because of real interest rates that are typically higher than the average rate 
in the financial markets of the developed world. This excess inflow of foreign 
currency causes appreciation in the real exchange rate and stagnates trade, upon 
which the whole idea of liberal growth is based. The antithesis also suggests that, the 
utilization of natural resources and cheap labor is the modern receipt for exploitation 
and slavery, and in the long run, those resources will be depleted and the working 
class would stay where they started, trying to survive with wages usually below or 
barely above the international poverty line. 
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Both sides have numerous cases and country studies proving their claims, and it is 
difficult to suggest that one is completely right or wrong. However, on the issue of 
foreign direct investment, the arguments of the antithesis holds truer than the 
liberalisation thesis. Hirst and Thompson (1996) prove that 75 percent of the total FDI 
flow is between U.S.A., Canada, Japan and the countries of European Union. 
Furthermore, these developed countries, the nine most important countries that attract 
direct investment (Singapore, Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Argentina, 
Thailand, Taiwan and Egypt) and the nine coastal Chinese provinces represent a 
major 91.5 percent of international investment flows.  
This is cause for some concern. U.S.A., Canada and Mexico are the members of 
North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA), most of the West European Countries are 
members of European Union (EU) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 
Brazil and Argentina are members of Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR), 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are members of Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), most of the rest of the countries are also East Asian success 
stories, some of which are already classified as developed rather than developing. The 
economy of Egypt itself is classified in all liberalisation indices as a closed economy. 
So, the pre-requisite for receiving some notable amount of foreign direct investment 
seems to be being a member of a regional agreement instead of undertaking 
liberalisation reforms. 
The globalisation versus regionalisation argument is another widely-debated issue in 
itself and will not be included more hereafter in this study. However, some key points 
in the debate can be examined in the works of Sideri (1997) and Hirst and Thompson 
(1996). 
2.1.3 General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
Established in 1948, GATT was first designed as a temporary institute that would act 
as a mediator between nations, solving mutual trade differences on a reciprocal basis 
and providing the developed world (mostly U.S.A., Western European countries and 
Japan) with freer means of trade.  
However, through time, the efforts of GATT served to give it a more permanent and 
regulating role. Trade codes like anti-dumping measures and preference of tariffs to 
quantitative restrictions and bans were agreed upon in various GATT conferences.  
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The most important conference held by GATT is the last conference and the series of 
debate ensued thereafter. This conference, called the Uruguay round, took eight years 
to complete (1986-1994). The signing of the final act of the Uruguay round brought 
about the widest multilateral agreement on free trade and established the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).  
Among the covered issues that are important to this study were: 
 The agreement taking agricultural trade under WTO supervision and calling 
for lowering of tariff rates and subsidization of agricultural products  
 The agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), according to 
which, rules which forced foreign investments to use domestic supply for 
production and to engage in exporting will be removed   
 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) which recognized the 
necessity of liberalising service trade 
 The agreement on textiles and clothing which stated that all quantitative 
restrictions on textiles and clothing will be converted into tariffs in the next ten 
years, and these tariffs will be lowered by 25 percent in this time 
 The agreements that encourages countries to use international standards when 
defining and demanding technical and sanitary standards from imported goods 
The signing of the Uruguay round marked an important turn in the history of 
international trade. Statistics show that the annual increase in international trade show 
an impressive rise since the signing of the Uruguay round, however, GATT principles 
has been criticized, especially after the establishment of WTO, on the grounds that the 
some of the agreement issues signed are not discriminating enough between 
developing and developed nations, and others are not discriminating at all.  
2.2 A Summary of the Literature 
Trade liberalisation has been a subject of much debate since the impacts of the 
unilateral liberalisation wave that started in the late 1970s and covered most of the 
third world have become more apparent. One of the major parts of this discussion 
focuses on the definition of the term “liberal” itself, others investigate various issues 
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such as the impacts of trade liberalisation on trade performance, income distribution, 
wage allocation and economic development. 
All of these arguments try to examine the nature and effects of liberalisation, and each 
will provide a key role in defining the term and its impacts. This study borrows some 
ideas on the definition of the term to contribute to the debate about its impacts on 
trade performance, economic development and income distribution. 
2.2.1 Defining Liberalisation 
The widest definition of the term can be an arrangement that removes restrictions on 
trade or substitutes restrictions that are less governing concerning the relative prices 
of tradable goods and services. In most cases, the restrictions are in the forms of 
quantitative restrictions (or, quotas) and tariffs. However, there are numerous other 
restrictions and distortions that can be imposed on trade, from the usage of multiple 
exchange rates to restrictions that use health codes, safety standards and 
environmental standards.  
The Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) covers 
most of the issues ranging from anti-dumping measures to the imposition of invisible 
barriers. However, it is clear that the definition of the term “trade barrier” itself is not 
unambiguous across countries, and thus, the usage of changes in nominal tariffs as the 
sole indicator of liberalisation is impossible. 
According to the study made by Choksi, Michaely and Papageourgiou (1991), a move 
towards liberalisation may mean reduction in the anti-export measures, increase in the 
reliance on the global price mechanisms or a reduction in the level of intervention. 
Thus, a decrease in the nominal tariff rates, a substitution of tariffs for quotas or a 
unification of multiple exchange rates all mean a step towards a more liberal 
economy. 
But, the point at where an economy may be considered open instead of closed is still 
uncertain, and defining this point is crucial in making analysis across a sample that 
contains more than one countries.  
In their most recent work, Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (2002) use three country 
indices as an indicator of liberalisation. These are derived from World Bank Reports 
on Adjustment Lending II and II (1990 and 1993A, respectively), Dean, Desai and 
Riedel’s work (1994) that details the liberalisation policies of 32 countries, and Sachs 
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and Warner’s (1995) liberalisation index that covers a sample of 117 countries and 
calculates whether they can be considered liberalised at some point or not. 
As for the present, the validity of these three indices used for defining the 
liberalisation date of developing countries, especially of the Sachs-Warner index, is 
generally accepted in the field. However, it should be noted that the work of 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) and Harrison and Hanson (1999) shows that many of 
the reported results in this index are not robust to changes in specification and sample 
frame.   
2.2.2 The Debate on the Impacts of Liberalisation 
This study focuses on the impacts of liberalisation on development economies, and 
attempts to find the reasons of success of failure of trade liberalisation reforms in 
trade performance and income distribution issues.  
The first and the most important problem for establishing the base for a meaningful 
analysis is the difficulty of extracting the effects of liberalisation from the effects of 
the rest of a country’s economic policies. Concerning the liberalisation episodes in 
developing countries, it can be said that in most cases the opening of the tradables 
sector to the global market is one of the numerous parts of a reform program that 
seeks to integrate the economy of the country to the globalised whole. So, the model 
that is constructed for the analysis should disentangle the rest of the effects from the 
effects of globalisation itself.  
There are two widely accepted methods for this analysis. One is the with-without 
method which takes a sample of countries that employed trade reform programs and 
compares them with a sample of other countries which did not employ similar 
programs. This method was used in World Bank (1990) and Mosley, Harrigan and 
Toye (1991). 
The second method is the before-after method which includes a time dimension to 
analyse the direction the economy went before and after the reform. This was also 
used in World Bank (1990) and Harrigan et al. (1991), but one of the most important 
examples for this method, and also for the discussion on the development impacts of 
liberalisation is the work of Choksi, Michaely and Papageourgiou (1991). In this 
study, the authors construct a development model and compare the economic 
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performance in the three years before and after liberalisation, evaluating 36 
liberalisation episodes in 19 countries. 
The work of Choksi, Michaely and Papageourgiou (1991) is the one that finds the 
growth enhancing effects of liberalisation strongest. These findings were later 
questioned in Greenaway (1993). Greenaway suggests that the measurement of 
liberalisation in the work of Papageourgiou et al. is flawed and there is no systematic 
evidence of connection between periods of reform and periods of growth acceleration. 
Greenaway is another respected authority in this field. In the conclusion of his work 
published in 1998, he suggests that: 
 
“A highly distorted trade regime can be both necessary and sufficient for slow growth; a liberal trade 
regime may be necessary but is certainly not sufficient for rapid growth. Trade liberalisation in itself 
will not take the economy to a new growth trajectory. It can help but needs to be compatible with other 
policy reforms and needs to be sustained and sustainable. Among other things this means paying due 
attention to the institutional infrastructure and the political economy of reform.” 
 
In Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (1997), the authors work with the sample of 
countries presented in the aforementioned study of Dean, Desai and Riedel (1994) and 
find that on the average, liberalisation brings about a “deterioration in growth” rather 
than enhancing it. As mentioned above, in their latest work (2002), the authors work 
with three sample countries with a different growth model, and this time find strong 
evidence of the growth-enhancing effects of liberalisation. 
Another important argument on trade liberalisation is about its impacts on trade 
performance, trade balance and therefore the external balance of payments. Santos-
Paulino examines the trade-enhancing effects of liberalisation in two works, one 
(2002A) concerning the effects on export performance and the other (2002B) 
concerning the effects on imports. In the conclusion part of his work “The Effects of 
Trade Liberalisation on Imports in Selected Developing Countries” he suggests that: 
 
“The excessive import growth following trade liberalisation episodes has serious policy implications, 
especially for the balance of trade and balance of payments, because in most cases imports increase by 
more than exports, causing trade imbalances. 
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Liberalisation needs to take place in such a way as to maintain a sustainable balance of payments 
position; otherwise the resource gain from liberalisation can easily be offset by real resources losses 
arising from the need for balance of payments adjustments (i.e. devaluation).”   
 
Santos-Paulino’s analysis of export performance under trade liberalisation (2002A) 
finds strong empirical evidence that suggests positive impact of liberalisation on 
export performance. However, the work of Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2001) find 
that liberalisation stimulated export growth, but raised import growth by more, thus 
led to a worsening balance of trade and balance of payments in developing countries.  
The impacts of trade liberalisation on income distribution and inequality are perhaps 
the hardest to determine. The main shortcoming in this field is the scarcity and non-
standard nature of inequality data. The definition of income varies across countries 
and among researches done in different periods. Because of this problem, most studies 
done in this field are country-studies. 
Two methods are generally used for the measurement of inequality: the calculation of 
GINI coefficients and the comparison of average wages between sectors or 
skilled/unskilled labor.  
There are two wide datasets that collect the gini coefficients calculated in various 
countries through time. The work of Deininger and Squire (1996) collects 682 
observations for 108 economies. The World Income Inequality Database (WIDER, 
2000) takes all the observations and calculations presented in the former work, and 
adds observations collected from various other, mostly local sources, bringing the 
total number of countries to 151 and the total number of observations to 5067. 
However, WIID includes observations that are classified as “less reliable”. 
The Stopler-Samuelson theory of income distribution states that in the case of trade 
openness, the income of the abundant production factor increases. For most of the 
developing countries, the abundant production factor is labor. So, according the 
Stopler-Samuelson theory, trade openness raises the income of the labor and serves in 
the favour of income equality. 
However, there are many studies that challenge this theory. Fischer (2001) states that 
the abundance of labor will not mean decreasing inequality if the land-land ratio of 
the country is low, a major part of the labor is employed in land-using production and 
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a small fraction is employed in capital-using production. In “The Evolution of 
Inequality after Trade Liberalisation” he states that: 
 
“(...) in countries that are well endowed in land or natural resources, so they are both capital- and 
poor-poor, liberalisation increases exports of natural resources and raises the return to their 
ownership. Since these factors are not held equitatively, inequality increases. Casual observation 
indicates that in Latin American countries, there has been an increase in inequality following trade 
liberalisation. In East Asian countries, the opposite seems to be the case. Latin American countries are 
known to be land- and resource-abundant, while East Asian countries are abundant in labor.”         
 
The work of Londono, Spilimbergo and Szekely (1999) find similar evidence on the 
effect of land abundance to inequality in the case of trade liberalisation. The evidence 
presented in their work also proves that the Hecksher-Ohlin framework and Stopler-
Samuelson theory are not in themselves sufficient to explain the outcomes of trade 
liberalisation concerning inequality. 
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3. THE IMPACTS OF LIBERALISATION ON GROWTH 
The main concern in a developing economy is to achieve a steady growth rate. 
International financial agencies that provide development assistance claim that a 
steady rate of growth and sustainable development should be achieved by being an 
integrated part of the globalised economy. Many developing countries went through 
liberalisation reforms to achieve this end. Thus, the first concern of this study is to 
define the impact of liberalisation on growth. 
3.1 Defining the Liberalisation Date 
As noted in the previous chapters, the definitions or the critical values of liberalisation 
indicators are not completely agreed upon in the literature. In this study, the index of 
liberalisation provided in the work of Sachs and Warner (1995) will be used to 
determine the liberalisation date of the subject countries1. Sachs and Warner index 
considers a country closed if its economic indicators show one of the following 
criteria: 
 Non-tariff barriers covering 40 percent or more of trade 
 Average tariff rates of 40 percent or more 
 A black market exchange rate that is depreciated by 20 percent or more 
relative to the official exchange rate, on average, during the 1970s or 1980s 
 A socialist economic system (as defined in Kornai, 1992) 
 A state monopoly on major exports 
The work of Sachs and Warner has been criticized in many studies (Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2000) and Harrison and Hanson (1999) being some examples), but it is still 
considered the most reliable liberalisation index in the literature, particularly for 
                                                 
1 The details of liberalisation reforms in these counties taken from Sachs and Warner (1995) are 
presented under Appendix 1 
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cross-country analyses like this study, because it has a wide range of coverage and 
liberalisation criteria that does not differ across countries.  
3.2 The Cause for Geographical Differentiation 
Uneven distribution of economic growth across countries and regions has been one of 
the main concerns of development economics since it became apparent that the 
outcome of liberalisation reforms has been different for Latin American, African and 
East Asian economies.  
With the exception of Philippines, the timing of liberalisation reform of all the East 
Asian developing countries falls outside the time scope of this study. Some of these 
countries are classified in Sachs and Warner index as “always open”, others have a 
liberalisation date between 1960-1970. For the purposes of cross-regional 
comparison, these countries will be included as a “control group” in this study while 
similar countries in Africa or Latin America will not.  
The reason for this choice of sample is the aim of this study, which is to define the 
impacts of liberalisation reforms rather than to analyse the progress of growth under 
liberalisation. As noted earlier, East Asian economies were the example set before all 
the other developing economies, and achieving a similar successful and rapid growth 
was the main goal in undergoing liberalisation reforms. 
Figure 3.1: Average Growth Rate of GDP Per Capita Across Regions
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Figure 3.1 shows the differences of growth between these regions. The critical point 
in the graph is the years 1985 and 1986. These were the worst years of global 
recession following the global debt crisis, and they mark the beginning of the third 
world liberalisation wave, before which, there was only one reformer country in Latin 
America and three in Africa. It is apparent that East Asian countries have recovered 
from the recession with only one year lost to stagnant growth while African countries 
managed to keep an unsteady but positive rate of growth until the 1990s. Latin 
American liberalisers, however, could not recover from the lost years, and although 
there have been periods of high growth in individual countries; the average growth 
rate has never been above three percent. 
The econometric models in this study take geographical locations into account 
because of this obvious difference. The analysis will be done in two major parts; one 
uses a sample that differentiates countries according to geographical location and the 
other uses a larger sample that covers all countries that underwent liberalisation. 
Although working with larger samples usually produces results that are more 
significant statistically, differentiated samples will be more appropriate for cross-
regional comparison. 
3.3 The Growth and Liberalisation Model 
For modelling growth and liberalisation together in the panel analysis, a core growth 
model is estimated first and a liberalisation dummy is introduced later into the model. 
The core growth equation is: 
 
(3.1)    Y = β0 + β1EXP + β2 INV + β3 POP + u 
 
where (Y) is the increase in GDP per capita, (EXP) is the growth in exports, (INV) is 
the ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP and (POP) is the increase in 
population.  
To this model, a variable that signifies the increase in GDP in year t-1 and a dummy 
variable that signifies the liberalisation date will be added. The variable that signifies 
the growth rate on year t-1 is added to diagnose the steadiness of growth rate. The 
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dummy for liberalisation will be used in two ways. In the first analysis, the dummy 
shifts to 1 on the year of liberalisation and all the following years unless there is a 
closing in the economy (as in the case of Venezuela). In the second analysis, the 
dummy variable shifts to 1 only on the year of liberalisation to capture the immediate 
effects. This variable will then be shifted two years further in two further analyses to 
diagnose the direction of the lagged effects of liberalisation in the first three years of 
reform. With these variables added, the model becomes: 
 
(3.2)  Yi,t = β0 + β1 Yi,t-1+ β2 EXPi,t + β3 POPi,t + β4 INVi,t + β5 LIB + u 
 
Where: 
Y = Δlog(GDP/POP) : The growth in GDP per capita 
EXP = Δlog(X) : The growth in exports 
POP = Δlog(POP) : The increase in population 
INV = (GDI/GDP) : The ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP 
LIB = Dummy variable for liberalisation 
3.4 Results of the Analyses 
The results of the equation are reported in tables 3.1 and 3.2. Table 3.1 refers to the 
analysis in which the liberalisation dummy takes the value of 1 for every year the 
economy is classified as “open” in the Sachs and Warner index and table 3.2 refers to 
the analysis in which the dummy takes the value of 1 for the opening year only.  
In the first analysis, all the variables have the logically predicted sign except the 
population variable. The variable with the highest coefficient and meaningfulness is 
Yt-1, which denotes the amount of increase in GDP per capita on year t-1. This 
suggests that a positive rate of growth in year t-1 contributes strongly to a positive 
growth in year t. The coefficient for exports is also meaningful and substantial and 
this underlines the importance of trade in the growth of developing countries. The 
coefficient for population, however, although quite large, is not significant. This is an  
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Table 3.1: Growth Equation with Continuous Liberalisation Dummy* 
Variable** 
Expanded 
Sample*** 
Complete 
Sample**** 
Latin America Africa 
Yt-1 0.121277 0.114355 0.196316 -0.026539 
 3.422836 2.928296 3.845293 -0.437740 
EXP 0.060593 0.049780 0.044323 0.055715 
 4.787427 3.573022 2.255697 2.847921 
POP -0.222539 0.002558 0.446408 -0.331724 
 -0.676122 0.005878 0.593891 -0.599260 
INV 0.002033 0.002118 0.002304 0.001673 
 6.585424 6.006148 4.737832 3.158374 
LIB 0.010254 0.010834 0.017291 0.000698 
 2.727103 2.662926 3.205324 0.109778 
R2 0.296238 0.198167 0.273732 0.146291 
Period 1973-95 1973-95 1973-95 1973-95 
Observations 794 662 373 289 
Countries 38 31 17 14 
* For the sources of data used to construct this model, see Appendix 2 
**t-ratios are given under the coefficient for each variable. Bold numbers indicate significance at at 
least %95 level.  
*** Includes East Asian countries 
**** Excludes East Asian countries 
  
unexpected result, and is most probably caused by the inherent problems of working 
with small samples with similar countries. 
The coefficients for the effect of investments, although meaningful, are insignificantly 
small. This does not coincide with the empirical results reported in Greenaway, 
Morgan and Wright (1997, 2002). These results indicate that the productivity of new 
investments are lower for the countries included in our sample. 
The liberalisation dummy is also statistically meaningful, and has a significant effect 
in all the samples except the African sample in the first analysis. Although it should 
be noted that both Sachs and Warner (1995) and Greenaway, Morgan and Wright 
(2002) find higher coefficients for their liberalisation dummy (0,0244 and 0,027 
respectively) while Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (1997) find no meaningful 
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Table 3.2: Growth Equation with Single Liberalisation Dummy* 
Variable** Complete Sample*** Latin America Africa 
Yt-1 0.124070 0.227938 -0.028167 
 3.163260 4.475026 -0.463107 
EXP 0.054225 0.053321 0.055857 
 3.894785 2.698598 2.869506 
POP -0.160442 -0.237356 -0.339341 
 -0.370376 -0.326035 -0.612753 
INV 0.002176 0.002441 0.001669 
 6.130609 4.955424 3.155135 
LIBt 0.004534 0.009421 -0.003170 
 0.529939 0.852114 -0.239447 
LIBt-1 0.008941 0.012591 0.004451 
 1.049382 1.133998 0.338944 
LIBt-2 0.008004 0.009622 0.005084 
 0.941904 0.870120 0.387285 
R2 0.189448 0.254016 0.146434 
Period 1973-95 1973-95 1973-95 
Observations 662 373 289 
Countries 31 17 14 
* For the sources of data used to construct this model, see Appendix 2 
**t-ratios are given under the coefficient for each variable. Bold numbers indicate significance at at 
least %95 level. 
*** Excludes East Asian countries 
 
coefficient. The fact that the sample which includes East Asian countries have higher 
meaning to its coefficients for liberalisation suggest that liberalisation is more 
important in the direction of the growth of economy in those countries (A separate 
analysis of East Asian economies for the same period produces a coefficient of 0,048 
at a t-ratio of 16.97 for the liberalisation dummy).   
In the second analysis, there are few changes in the direction of the effects of 
variables. Investments still have significant but very little effect on growth, and 
population still has no meaningful effect. 
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The significance of liberalisation that was present in the first model, however, is 
missing in the second analysis. The t-ratio of liberalisation comes close to 
meaningfulness in the second year of reform for the complete sample and Latin 
American sample. In African sample, it shows no sign of meaning. This is completely 
in contrast with the results reported in Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (2002), where 
the coefficient for liberalisation dummy in a similar analysis is negative but 
insignificant in the first year, positive but insignificant in the second year and positive 
and significant in the third year. These results suggest that liberalisation, while 
contributing to the overall growth for the Latin American sample, does not have an 
immediate growth-enhanching effect for the two sample of countries included in this 
study.  
The before-after method detailed in Chapter 2 is used in this analysis. For this sample, 
it is found that liberalisation reforms make no meaningful effect to the rate of growth 
immediately, although a meaningful effect of liberalisation on growth is observed 
among the sample. This suggests that economies require time to adjust to the changes 
brought by the reform. Defining the differences between liberal and non-liberal 
economies would require a with-without analysis which is beyond the scope of this 
study. However, it should be noted that Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (1997) 
includes a with-without analysis and find a negative and meaningful coefficient for 
their liberalisation dummy. 
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4. THE IMPACTS OF LIBERALISATION ON TRADE BALANCE 
The management of external trade balance is on of the most difficult and critical 
problems an open developing economy faces. Keeping real interest rates near the 
international level is essential in dealing with this problem since international hot 
money flows change direction, seeking the highest arbitrage rate for short term 
investments. If domestic real interest rates are higher than international average, 
speculative money flows enter the financial market and the real exchange rate 
appreciates. This decreases exports and increases imports, and the external trade 
balance worsens. 
Another important issue is the size and saving/consumption rate of the internal 
market. When the domestic economy is open to international markets, these indicators 
define the amount of imports. It is because of this fact that economies with higher 
consumption rates and larger internal markets usually do not fare as well as smaller 
economies with a higher saving ratio in the matter of keeping the external trade 
balance steady after liberalisation reform.  
Developing countries that open their markets usually follow dual policies in these 
issues; the removal or relaxing of the trade barriers are followed by a substantial 
devaluation and a narrowing of the internal consumption through a depreciation of the 
real wages. These policies, however, have two major setbacks. (1) It is not politically 
possible to keep real wages down for long periods unless undemocratic/military 
means are involved, and such means almost always worsen the economy in every 
possible way and (2) developing economies rely on high technology imports to keep 
their industry up to the standards of the international market. A devaluation may or 
may not be helpful in keeping a stable external trade balance for a short term, but it 
always stagnates investment, which is much harmful to the external competitiveness 
of the economy in the long run. 
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The employment of these policies fail to keep the economy from entering a vicious 
cycle in which the real exchange rate appreciates because of speculative foreign 
exchange inflows and, after a period of stagnating exports and overvalued local 
currency, financial crisis and substantial escape of foreign exchange devastates the 
economy. A solution to this problem is suggested by Tobin in the 1970s in the form of 
tax imposition on capital flows. This measure was employed successfully by Chile 
and Chilean economy has not experienced any disruptive devaluation or financial 
crisis since late 1970s (Zahler, 1992 and Felix, 1995). 
4.1 Regional Differentiation Concerning International Trade 
  The problem of regional differentiation is present concerning international trade 
integration as it was in the case of economic growth distribution. Table 4.1 shows the 
ratio of exports to GDP in Latin America, Africa and East Asia. The obvious 
difference calls for a regionally differentiated econometric analysis as well as the 
employment of a complete sample of developing countries.  
Table 4.1: The Share of Exports to GDP (%) 
 1970s Average 1980s Average 1990-1995 Average 
Latin America 24.16 24.36 29.83 
Highest Jamaica (35.15) Guyana (59.7) Guyana (105.21) 
Lowest Brazil (7.26) Argentina (8.82) Argentina (8.14) 
Africa 25.4 28.04 28.76 
Highest Zambia (43.76) Botswana (59.93) Gambia (56.6) 
Lowest Guinea-Bissau (5.42) Guinea-Bissau (9.88) Uganda (8.51) 
East Asia 52.1 66.63 75.95 
Highest Hong Kong (88.25) Hong Kong (105.59) Hong Kong (140.92) 
Lowest Indonesia (22.37) Philipinnes (24.31) Indonesia (23,43) 
Source: World Development Indicators 2001 CD, Worldbank 
Another main differentiation is the structure of exports. The level of value-added of 
export products is important for an economy in keeping the eternal balance of trade 
steady and assuring meaningful profit from exports. It is widely accepted in trade 
economics that exporting of high value-added manufactures is much more beneficial 
to an economy than exporting large amounts of low value-added food products 
(Santos-Paulino, 2002A; Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall, 2001; Fischer, 2001). Table 
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4.2 shows the differences in the ratio of food products and manufactures in exports in 
developing countries across regions. 
Table 4.2: The Export Composition Differences of Sampled Countries  
Food Products 1970s Average 1980s Average 1990-1995 Average 
Latin America 46.05 41.52 41.23 
Highest Costa Rica (74.22) Honduras (81.54) Honduras (82.49) 
Lowest Venezuela (1.19) Venezuela (1.3) Venezuela (2.5) 
Africa 52.02 36.1 30 
Highest Gambia (99.15) Uganda (94.12) Uganda (91.76) 
Lowest Zambia (1.12) Zambia (2.76) Zambia (3.3) 
East Asia 24.07 17.76 11.20 
Highest Thailand (55.3) Thailand (46.08) Thailand (24.02) 
Lowest Hong Kong (1.82) Hong Kong (1.7) Hong Kong (2.54) 
Manufactures 1970s Average 1980s Average 1990-1995 Average 
Latin America 16.73 19.42 28.12 
Highest Jamaica (52.22) Jamaica (58.21) Jamaica (68) 
Lowest Venezuela (1.446) Bolivia (2.41) Ecuador (5.24) 
Africa 9.9 22.86 36.46 
Highest South Africa (34.01) Tunisia (49.39) Tunisia (73.52) 
Lowest Gambia (0.1) Ghana (0.76) Guinea-Bissau (0.18) 
East Asia 37.11 49.75 69.06 
Highest Hong Kong (96.39) Hong Kong (95.65) Hong Kong (93.83) 
Lowest Indonesia (1.64) Indonesia (14.46) Indonesia (46.55) 
Fuels 1970s Average 1980s Average 1990-1995 Average 
Latin America 10.95 17.38 13.09 
Highest Venezuela (93.35) Venezuela (87.93) Venezuela (78.9) 
Lowest Guyana (0.03) Paraguay (0) Paraguay (0.25) 
Africa 5.89 10.86 8.77 
Highest Tunisia (36.48) Tunisia (36.85) Cameroon (39.51) 
Lowest Mali (0.15) Guinea Bissau (0.06) Uganda (0.05) 
East Asia 12.17 15.21 8.33 
Highest Indonesia (59.13) Indonesia (62.22) Indonesia (32.66) 
Lowest Hong Kong (0.02) Hong Kong (0.22) Hong Kong (0.57) 
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Table 4.2: The Export Composition Differences of Sampled Countries (continued) 
Ores and Metals (% share in exports) 
 1970s Average 1980s Average 1990-1995 Average 
Latin America 17.48 13.93 10.85 
Highest Chile (76.86) Chile (59.05) Chile (47.57) 
Lowest Paraguay (0.01) Paraguay (0.08) Paraguay (0.15) 
Africa 18.2 13.18 9.37 
Highest Mauritania (85.23) Mauritania (64.17) Mauritania (41.58) 
Lowest Guinea-Bissau (0.24) Uganda (0.23) Uganda (0.48) 
East Asia 8.47 4.68 2.38 
Highest Philipinnes (17.4) Philipinnes (11.4) Philipinnes (5.7) 
Lowest Hong Kong (0.9) Korea Rep. (0.89) Thailand (0.67) 
Source: World Development Indicators 2001 CD, Worldbank 
 
4.2 The Trade Balance and Liberalisation Model 
The key issues discussed so far in this chapter shape out the model for external trade 
balance as: 
(4.1) XMi,t = β0 + β1PCi,t + β2TTIi,t + β3RERi,t + β4FOODi,t + β5MANi,t + β6FUELi,t + 
β7OREi,t + β8LIBi,t + u 
Where: 
XM: The ratio of exports to imports 
PC: The ratio of private consumption to GDP  
TTI: Terms of trade index (1987=1) 
RER: Real exchange rate index (1995=1) 
FOOD: The share of food products in exports 
MAN: The share of manufactures products in exports 
FUEL: The share of fuels in exports 
ORE: The share of ores and minerals in exports  
LIB: Dummy variable for liberalisation 
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Table 4.3: Trade balance equation with continuous liberalisation dummy* 
Variable** 
Expanded 
Sample*** 
Complete 
Sample**** 
Latin America Africa 
PC -1.149638 -1.016920 -1.561189 -0.419421 
 -8.536054 -7.024546 -7.485734 -2.490724 
TTI -0.221665 -0.193871 -0.146961 -0.293573 
 -6.565840 -5.275159 -3.038498 -5.563485 
RER 0.157398 0.155540 0.153668 0.036107 
 8.145991 7.764562 7.086954 0.416842 
FOOD 0.093283 0.157027 0.172434 0.362798 
 0.957941 1.508896 1.428015 1.616190 
MAN 0.087410 0.596818 0.808268 0.378648 
 0.876407 4.200494 4.304822 1.860684 
FUEL 0.426532 0.525899 0.662595 0.354498 
 3.517138 3.887379 3.942217 1.610003 
ORE 0.101714 0.034600 -0.087260 0.321844 
 0.732195 0.238921 -0.429950 1.702141 
LIB -0.027463 -0.068141 -0.076787 0.028681 
 -1.184569 -2.615622 -2.452977 0.631400 
R2 0.538259 0.536130 0.494516 0.734226 
Period 1973-95 1973-95 1973-95 1973-95 
Observations 646 508 367 141 
Countries 37 31 17 14 
* For the sources of data used to construct this model, see Appendix 2 
** t-ratios are given under the coefficient for each variable. Bold numbers indicate significance at 
%90 level, Bold and italicised numbers indicate significance at at least %95 level 
*** Includes East Asian countries 
**** Excludes East Asian countries 
4.3 Results of the Analyses 
The results of the analyses are reported in tables 4.3 and 4.4. As it was predicted and 
mentioned, the coefficients of private consumption are significant and negative in 
both analyses. Similarly, the coefficients of real exchange rate are, with the exception 
of African sample, positive and meaningful, indicating that a depreciation in the real 
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exchange rate works in favour of external trade balance. The coefficients of terms of 
trade variable, are negative and meaningful. The negative results for this variable 
show that the main competitive power of developing economies in international trade 
is the low price of their goods, and a shift in terms of trade that would be regarded as 
“favourable” effects the external trade balance of these countries in the opposite 
direction.  
Concerning trade composition, the coefficients of FOOD variable are not meaningful 
in both analyses, although it comes very close to significance for all samples except 
expanded sample. MAN variable is insignificant only in the analysis of the expanded 
sample with the continous dummy variable for liberalisation, and this shows the 
importance of manufactured exports for the trade balance of developing countries.  
The variables FUEL and ORE give up different and interesting results. FUEL is 
significant for all samples except the African sample in both analyses and ORE is 
insignificant for all samples in all analyses, but it comes very close to significance for 
the African sample in both. This is caused by the export mix differences of the 
samples. Fuel exports are very important for some oil producing and exporting Latin 
American countries. Similarly, some African countries are producers and exporters of 
precious metals which makes the export share of ores important for that sample.  
The coefficients of the liberalisation variable reveal an important issue. In the 
continous dummy variable model, the coefficient for liberalisation is, again with the 
exception of the African sample, negative. These coefficients are meaningful in the 
complete sample excluding Asian countries and in the fixed effects model for the 
Latin American sample.  
The results of the singular dummy variable analysis reveal a further problem: In the 
LIBt variable, the coefficients for all samples except the African sample are positive 
and meaningful, and the coefficient for the African sample comes very close to 
significance. In the LIBt-1 variable, both of the coefficients for the Latin American 
sample increase and become more significant, however, the coefficients for the 
complete sample lose impact and meaning, and the coefficients for the African 
sample move in the same direction without becoming negative. 
In the LIBt-2 variable, both the Latin American coefficients and the complete sample 
coefficients lose significance, and the coefficients for the African sample stay  
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Table 4.4: Trade balance equation with single liberalisation dummy* 
Variable** Complete Sample*** Latin America Africa 
PC -1.038614 -1.631606 -0.409024 
 -7.184704 -7.887057 -2.449272 
TTI -0.157838 -0.100931 -0.291175 
 -4.575956 -2.264591 -5.576515 
RER 0.158415 0.159082 0.025590 
 7.900942 7.319050 0.302955 
FOOD 0.144744 0.152324 0.358970 
 1.390302 1.260245 1.617291 
MAN 0.432171 0.632063 0.447046 
 3.362216 3.605705 2.604430 
FUEL 0.490237 0.598711 0.360230 
 3.640974 3.599431 1.649490 
ORE 0.093574 0.003341 0.302151 
 0.652254 0.016586 1.617290 
LIBt 0.102681 0.104529 0.108705 
 2.314048 1.964954 1.548232 
LIBt-1 0.086781 0.119214 0.012724 
 1.880504 2.151604 0.177513 
LIBt-2 -0.004773 0.010928 -0.024519 
 -0.109851 0.201689 -0.406208 
LIBt-3  -0.047266  
  -0.866273  
R2 0.534679 0.491364 0.738565 
Period 1973-1995 1973-1995 1973-1995 
Observations 508 367 141 
Countries 31 17 14 
* For the sources of data used to construct this model, see Appendix 2 
**t-ratios are given under the coefficient for each variable. Bold numbers indicate significance at 
%90 level, Bold and italicised numbers indicate significance at at least %95 level. 
***Excludes East Asian countries 
insignificant, however, this time both the complete and African samples are negative. 
This trend continues for the Latin America, for which the coefficient for the LIBt-3 
variable becomes negative (The analysis for the LIBt-3 variable is not compatible with 
the general analysis since the African sample has to be changed because of the four 
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economies that opened in 1993, thus, it is also not compatible in the case of the 
complete sample).   
This causes some serious concerns by revealing that, for this sample, the effect of 
trade liberalisation on trade balance, although positive initially, shifts into the 
opposite direction within four years. Developing countries undertake rigorous 
liberalisation reforms to benefit from a rise in the external trade profits, and these 
results indicate that liberal trade does not work in favour of the developing 
economies.  
A probable and logical criticism of this modelling can be the obvious corellation 
between the variables that define the composition of trade. This is most probably the 
reason that causes the FOOD variable, which should have a negative coefficients, be 
they significant or not, to have positive ones. Truly, during the study with an 
alternative model which incorporates the composition variables seperately, the 
coefficient for the FOOD variable was found to have negative and insignificant 
coefficients for all samples expect the African sample, for which it had a positive but 
still insignificant coefficient. However, the general level of significane was very low 
for this alternative model and it was found that the model that is presented in this 
study is more appropriate. 
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5. THE IMPACTS OF LIBERALISATION ON INCOME INEQUALITY 
Income distribution is an issue that is more important in developing economies than 
developed ones since the amount on income to be distributed is considerably smaller 
in the latter than it is in the former. An unequal distribution in a developed economy 
usually does not have disruptive social effects unless the amount of inequality is very 
high, but an unequal distribution of the scarce income in a developing economy 
means a higher percent of the population lives with income that is beneath the 
international poverty line. Adversely, income inequality is uniformly higher in the 
developing economies than the developed ones.   
This chapter investigates the change in income distribution after liberalisation 
reforms. A set of inequality data is collected from various sources (Deininger and 
Squire, 1996, WIDER, 2000, Bourguigon and Morrison, 1989 and Global Poverty 
Monitoring Page at www.worldbank.org) for the model constructed and used in this 
chapter. 
The rising inequality rates of income distribution in some developing countries after 
trade liberalisation has been the cause for some concern, particularly because 
expectations had been quite on the contrary. The most important case in this issue is 
the case of Latin America, where the gini coefficients for inequality, which were 
already higher than the international average, showed considerable increase after the 
liberalisation reforms. 
The explanation of this requires a somewhat differentiated method of the classical 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory where the economy is considered a three-factor 
economy instead of two, the third factor being arable land. Studies (Fischer, 2001, 
Laemer et. al, 1999, Londono et. al, 1999) prove that a country with a land/labor ratio 
that is higher than world average will experience a rise in income inequality after 
trade liberalisation since land property is unevenly distributed and workers in 
agriculture get the lowest wages in the economy. The same studies also prove that a 
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higher capital per worker ratio is associated with a lower inequality since workers 
employed in high-capital sectors earn higher wages. 
This explains the post-reform worsening of the income distribution in Latin American 
countries, all of which (except Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Uruguay) are land-
abundant economies with capital per worker ratios lower than world average (Leamer 
et. al, 1999). 
5.1 The Model for Inequality 
Constructing a meaningful model for income inequality is very hard because of the 
scarcity of data for some variables, particularly in the earlier periods. Another 
problem is the inconsistent and differentiated nature of the gini coefficients. To 
overcome these problems, a model that is different from the growth and trade models 
is used.  
The model for inequality relies on one observation per country that spans a period of 
time. This period ideally starts with the year of liberalisation, but due to the scarcity 
of gini data, a one-year blending in the either direction is allowed (i.e. the period may 
start at t-1 or t+1 with t being the year of opening). The variables are then calculated 
to represent the average value of the data for the time period. 
The difference of this model from those that are presented in the accounted works 
above is that this model uses the change in gini coefficient in the observation period 
as the dependent variable instead of the gini coefficient itself. It is thus possible to 
observe the contribution of the variables to the change in inequality. 
Due to the mentioned inconsistency in the data set for gini coefficients, a number of 
countries have been dropped from the sample. Full details of the sample are given in 
Table 5.1    
 
(5.1) DGINIi = β0 + β1L/Li + β2CIIi + β3SCHi + β4FNOi + β5LOPi + β6PERi + u 
 
Where: 
DGINI: The change in the gini coefficient in the time period 
L/L: The average Labor / Arable Land ratio in the time period 
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CII: The average ratio of investment to GDP in the time period 
SCH: The level of secondary school completion at the start of the period 
FNO: The average ratio of fuel and ore products in exports in the time period 
LOP: Length of the period 
PER: Dummy variable that becomes 1 if at least half of the period is in the 1990s  
 
The variable for fuel and ore exports is inserted into the model since none of the 
factors in the three-factor model represent the contribution of this sector to the 
economy. The LOP and PER variables are inserted to absorb the effects of the length 
and time differences across observations, and the coefficients for both of these 
variables are expected to be positive. SCH variable is inserted into the model to 
calculate the effects of schooling to inequality. The wage inequality literature and 
higher returns to skill under liberalisation suggests that the coefficient of this variable 
is also going to be positive.   
5.2 Results of the Analysis 
The results of the analysis are reported in table 5.1. The signs of all the variables of 
the equation are in lines with the logical predictions made beforehand, however, the 
restricted size and similarity of the sample causes the coefficients to have low 
significance.  
Concerning investments, the CII variable has a positive coefficient that is close to 
significance. The variable representing capital stock shows effects of various direction 
in different studies. Londono et al. and Fischer find positive coefficients for their 
investment variables while Leamer at al. find negative coefficients. Although not 
completely meaningful, the result of this study suggests that new investments that are 
made after the liberalisation reform causes an increase in inequality. This may have 
two possible explanations. The new investments may have higher technology and 
lower labor input or they may be trying to be more competitive by using cheap labor. 
With the effects of liberalisation reforms on investments and real wages accounted in 
Chapter 4 taken into account, the second explanation seems more likely. 
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Table 5.1: Inequality Equation* 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio** 
Constant -20.21565 -1.965835 
L/L -1.497380 -1.767344 
CII 0.454814 1.444657 
SCH 0.706976 1.234784 
FNO -9.807073 -1.585540 
LOP 2.127573 2.461581 
PER 6.519085 1.052364 
R2 0.662428  
Observations*** 18  
* For the sources of data used to construct this model, see Appendix 2 
** Bold numbers indicate significance at %90 level, Bold and italicised numbers indicate significance 
at at least %95 level 
*** The sample for this equation includes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Mauritania, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa, Uganda, 
Venezuela and Zambia 
 
The SCH variable has the predicted sign, although its significance is considerably 
lower. This is also expected when the contradictory effects of education on inequality 
is considered. Education of labor lowers overall income inequality (Fischer, 2001, 
Laemer et. al, 1999, Londono et. al, 1999) but causes a widening in the wage 
inequality (Arbahce et al., 2001, Bejer et al., 1999, Gonzalez and McKinley, 1997) 
The coefficient of L/L variable is both negative and significant, and this reproduces 
the findings of the accounted income inequality works concerning the effects of land 
abundance to inequality. 
The positive nature of LOP and PER variables have been also expected, but the 
insignificance of PER variable shows that the period of the reform in itself does not 
have a meaningful difference concerning inequality. 
However, the contribution of fuel and ore exports (represented by the FNO variable) 
to inequality does not have the predicted sign. Although not meaningful, the t-ratio of 
this variable is very close to significance, and shows that fuel and ore exports do not 
increase inequality. This is contrary to the assumptions made by Fischer (2001) who 
suggests that the unequal nature of ownership in these sectors would lead to more 
inequality.  
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From the results of the inequality analysis, it can be concluded that the timing of 
liberalisation reform would make a significant difference to the direction income 
inequality will have after the reform. Countries that are well endowed in skilled labor 
and capital show decreasing rates of inequality after the reform since higher returns 
on these factors play an equalizing role. Land abundant countries which rely on food 
exports in keeping the external trade balance positive suffer from increasing 
inequality since land ownership is quite static and unequal and the wages of the 
unskilled workers employed in agriculture are very low. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has used a sample of 31 developing countries that is divided into the sub-
samples of 17 Latin American and 14 African countries in three analyses to explain 
the impacts of liberalisation reforms on developing economies. These analyses have 
been on the impacts of liberalisation on economic growth, on external trade balance 
and on income inequality. Another sample of 7 East Asian countries have been 
included as a control group in the first two analyses and the results for each analysis is 
reported in the corresponding chapter. 
The analysis of the impacts of liberalisation on economic growth, shows that for all 
samples except the African sample, liberalisation has a positive overall effect to 
growth, but the same analysis proves that liberalisation reforms have no immediate 
effect on growth.  
However, in the analysis of the impacts of liberalisation on trade performance and 
external trade balance, contradictory results have been driven. In this analysis, it is 
found that liberalisation have no immediate effect in favour of trade balance, and the 
overall impact of trade liberalisation on external trade balance is negative.  
These results, coupled with the findings of Hirst and Thompson (1993) on the issue of 
the unequal distribution of foreign direct investment confirm the skepticism of this 
study in approaching the claims made by Bretton-Woods agencies and former WTO 
concerning the beneficial nature of liberalisation. The pro-liberalisation thought 
claims that the three major benefits from the opening of the developing economies 
would be (1) the inflow of foreign direct investment which will raise the GDP 
considerably and enable these countries to close the technological gap between them 
and developed nations more easily, (2) the employment of the abundant factors, which 
is, in most cases, cheap labor costs, and the exploitation of scale economies to 
experience a positive trade balance and, (3) a shift in the income distribution towards 
equality with reduced unemployment, fairer wages, better education and higher 
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returns to skill. These three benefits would enable the developing third world 
countries to secure a sustained development and increase the standard of living of 
their citizens, catch up with the developed world both in technology and level of 
national production, and service their considerable stock of external debt without any 
problem of serious financial shortage.  
Most of the countries included in our sample experienced little or no inflow of foreign 
direct investment with the three exceptions of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, 
liberalisation have only worsened their external trade balance and an increase in 
income inequality have been experienced, particularly in Latin America. So, even if 
the claims of pro-liberalisation thought are true, there is no empirical evidence of their 
attainment in the countries sampled in the course of this study. Since these countries 
represent almost all of the developing world of today (most of the East Asian 
countries are today classified as nearly industrialized countries (NICs) instead of 
developing countries), the answer to the question of whether or not liberalisation 
really works in the favour of the liberalisers and not the developed world remains 
obscure. 
The only positive effect of liberalisation found, as mentioned before, have been the 
effect of liberalisation to overall growth. With the results of other studies considered, 
the only logical explanation to this phenomenon is that liberalisation and structural 
adjustments have made some corrections concerning the ever-present mis-
management, stagnation and corruption in these economies. However, it is obvious 
that such corrections could have been done without undertaking austerity policies and 
performing unilateral liberalisation measures that brought the level of protection of 
these countries even below that of some developed economies. 
The now developed countries of East Asia have been the examples of success for the 
rest of the developing world in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, neither the 
nature of economies of the reforming countries, nor the nature of their liberalisation 
reforms reflected no similarities in policy. East Asian economies were uniformly 
labor-abundant, thus the major output of their economies were low or high value-
added manufactures. Their population were considerably smaller, they had reasonably 
higher stocks of capital per worker, the education level of their population were much 
higher than Latin American and African countires, and, most importantly, their 
liberalisation processes have been smooth and selective. The countries of Latin 
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America and Africa, on the other hand, were mostly food producing. They had very 
low stocks of capital and education levels, their population had been larger than the 
East Asian countries, and their liberalisation reforms were made rapidly and without 
any selective consideration. All these differences led to the results that are contrary to 
those experienced by East Asian economies after the liberalisation reforms. 
The wave of liberalisation reforms was initiated by the developed countries through 
actions undertaken by Bretton-Woods agencies such as IMF as a solution to the debt 
problem of the less developed third world, and the reason of this policy was providing 
these countries with a means to service their debt without problem. Although many 
other benefits were claimed to be attained by liberalisation, there is no evidence to 
those claims except a steady servicing of the debt from the countries of Latin America 
and Africa. Meanwhile, widening inequality in those nations created small elite castes 
in the society which disregard all notions of social welfare, dominate the policy 
making to their ends and exploit cheap labor without any effort to make it less 
cheaper and more endowed in education. This vicious cycle led to a new system of 
pseudo-slavery where the majority of the population of the third world works for very 
low wages to provide the elite few of their countries with non tradable goods to sell 
back to them and tradable goods to sell to the developed world. The developed 
countries benefit from cheaper market prices and steady debt service, the rich of the 
developing world benefit from the high mark-up rates enabled by the low cost of 
labor, and working class do not enjoy any rise in its standards of living. When these 
facts are considered, the explanation to the problem of widening technology gap is 
plain. Industries that are labor, and more importantly, land or natural resource 
intensive are much more profitable to the holders of capital stock of the third world 
since they require no risky investments, have a steady output and low costs of labor. 
This is the most probable of the present explanations to why the share of 
manufactures in exports, the most beneficial sector to the economy of a country as a 
whole, is so small in developing countries. 
These facts confirm the validity of the questioning point of view expressed in the 
introductory chapter. However, another study, this time encorporating a with-without 
analysis of the impacts of liberalisation, would be required to be completely sure of 
these suggestions. 
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APPENDIX 1: DETAILS OF LIBERALISATION REFORMS IN SAMPLED 
COUNTRIES, AS PRESENTED IN SACHS AND WARNER, 1995 
Latin America: 
Argentina Open since 1991. The average nominal tariff level for manufacturing 
was 141 percent in 1958 (Little, Scitovsky, and Scott, 1970, p.163). 
The liberalisation in 1976-80 did not sufficiently reduce effective rates 
of protection (estimated at 88 for all manufacturing in 1980, from 
Cavallo and Cottani, 1991, table 3.19). The dating of liberalisation in 
1991 is based on TIDE, p.17. 
Bolivia Open 1966-79, closed 1979-84, open since 1985. The dating is based 
on black market premium data and information on trade policy in 
Sachs and Morales (1988). 
Brazil Open since 1991. Brazil is rated as closed before 1991, based on the 
evidence in Coes (1991). Specifically, the average effective protection 
rates in 1967 and 1973 exceeded 40 percent. In addition, the index of 
trade liberalisation indicates that 1973 was the most liberal year during 
the period 1947-82, so we rate this period as insufficiently liberal by 
our standards. A high black market premium also disqualifies Brazil in 
the early 1960s and the period 1975-89. The 1991 dating is based on 
the reforms of Collor administration.  
Chile Open since 1976. Chile is classified as closed in the 1950s, based on 
the accounts of important prohibitions, licensing, and multiple 
exchange rates in various issues of the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Restrictions covering the years 1950-61. For the 1960s, 
Chile is not rated as open because the mean black market premium was 
54 percent. The 1976 dating for the liberalisation is based on 
Dornbusch and Edwards in Bosworth, Dornbusch and Laban (1994, pp 
84-85) as well as Papageorgiou, Michaely and Choksi (1991, Vol.7, 
figure 2.3) 
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Colombia Open since 1986. Colombia has had a complicated mixture of tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions since 1931. Its classification as closed 
economy is based on the fact that the index of trade liberalisation in 
Garcia Garcia (1991) is fairly constant between 1950 and 1983, as well 
as evidence that average tariffs exceeded 40 percent in 1962, 1971 and 
1973 (Diaz-Alejandro, 1976, p.108). The liberalisation episodes in 
1954, 1966 and 1979 were too short to qualify as sustained 
liberalisations. The dating for the opening is based on evidence in 
Garay (1991) that average tariff rates fell below 40 percent in 1986 and 
have stayed low up to the present. 
Costa Rica Open 1952-61, closed 1962-85, open since 1986. In the 1950s Costa 
Rica had no exchange restrictions on foreign payments and no import 
licensing (IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, various 
issues). Imports could be obtained freely at an exchange rate that was 
17 percent more depreciated than the rate at which exports had to be 
surrendered to the central bank. In 1960 Costa Rica joined the Central 
American Common Market (CACM), so 1961 is chose as the date of 
closure. The mean common external tariff in the CACM was 40 
percent in 1966 (Carnoy, 1972, p.14). Costa Rica had a mean black 
market premium in excess of 20 percent in the period 1960-64. The 
mean external tariff was 53 percent before 1986 (World Bank, 1992a, 
p.86). The dating for the reform in the 1980s is based on the decline in 
the black market premium to 1 percent (1985-89) and the 1986 tariff 
liberalisation, which reduced the mean tariff to 26 percent (World 
Bank, 1992a, p.86) 
Ecuador Open 1950-82, closed 1983-90, open since 1991. The dating of the 
initial liberal phase is based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Restrictions from the early 1950s, which states that import licenses 
were, “in most cases”, issued freely, and De Janvry, Sadoulet, and 
Fargeix (1991, p.58) who report implied trade taxes for the period 
1970-85. Extensive trade reform was started in 1990. By 1991 virtually 
all the non-tariff restrictions have been eliminated. The maximum tariff 
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was 35 percent in 1990. Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country 
Report 3, 1991; and TIDE, p.140) 
El Salvador Open 1950-61, closed 1962-89, open since 1989. El Salvador assumed 
the obligations of article VIII in 1946. In 1950 and early 1960s import 
licenses were not required, and there were few restrictions on payment 
or transfers abroad (IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 
various issues). In 1960, El Salvador joined the Central American 
Common Market (CACM), so 1961 is chose as the date of closure. The 
mean common external tariff in the CACM was 40 percent in 1966 
(Carnoy, 1972, p.14). The mean external tariff was 53 percent 1966-86 
(World Bank, 1992a, p.86). The 1989 dating is based on TIDE, p.151. 
Guatemala Open 1950-61, closed 1962-89, open since 1988. Guatemala assumed 
the obligations of article VIII in 1947. In 1950 and early 1960s there 
was no import licensing nor significant restrictions on payments or 
transfers abroad (IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 
various issues). In 1960, Guatemala joined the Central American 
Common Market (CACM), so 1961 is chose as the date of closure. The 
mean common external tariff in the CACM was 40 percent in 1966 
(Carnoy, 1972, p.14). The mean external tariff was 53 percent 1966-86 
(World Bank, 1992a, p.86). The election of a civilian government in 
1985 started a period of reform. The 1988 dating is based on TIDE, 
p.196. 
Guyana Open since 1988. A high mean black market premium (298 percent) 
disqualifies Guyana between about 1975 and late 1980s. Prior to 1988 
there was an extensive list of import prohibitions and restrictions, 
which have since been greatly reduced (World Bank, 1993b, p.32). In 
1991 Guyana adopted the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
common external tariff schedule, with rates that average well below 40 
percent. The 1988 dating is based on TIDE, p.210, that this was the 
decisive year of reform. 
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Honduras Open 1950-61, closed 1962-90, open since 1991. Honduras assumed 
the obligations of article VIII in 1947. In 1950 and early 1960s there 
was no significant restrictions on payments or transfers abroad (IMF, 
Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, various issues). In 1960, 
Honduras joined the Central American Common Market (CACM), so 
1961 is chose as the date of closure. The mean common external tariff 
in the CACM was 40 percent in 1966 (Carnoy, 1972, p.14). The mean 
external tariff was 53 percent 1966-86 (World Bank, 1992a, p.86). An 
extensive trade reform between 1990 and 1992 included the 
elimination of import permits and administrative foreign exchange 
allocation. Import tariffs were reduced to a range of 5-20 percent 
(TIDE, p.214). 
Jamaica Open from independence (1962) to 1973, closed 1973-89, open since 
1989. The classification as open in the 1960s is based on various issues 
of the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, and data 
showing that the mean black market premium was only 6 percent. The 
IMF’s 1967 report states that “most goods may be imported freely 
under an open general license” (p.348). Jamaica is disqualified 
between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s, based on a high mean 
black market premium. The 1973 and 1989 datings are based on TIDE, 
p.239. Referring to the recent reforms, Williamson (1992) states 
“Quantitative restrictions eliminated and tariffs lowered to 20 percent 
to 30 percent for most items” (p.373). 
Mexico Open since 1986. A combination of moderate tariffs and extensive 
import licensing since the early 1950s. In the 1960s, 80 percent of tariff 
lines were covered by licensing (Bueno, 1971, p.181). A high black 
market premium also disqualifies Mexico in the early 1980s. The 
dating of liberalisation is based on TIDE, p.328. 
Nicaragua Open 1950-60, closed 1961-90, open since 1991. In the 1950s 
Nicaragua had import licensing and surcharges for acquiring foreign 
exchange for importing, but the licenses were freely granted and the 
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average surcharge did not exceed 40 percent (IMF, Annual Report on 
Exchange Restrictions, various issues). The open period ends in the 
1960s since the mean black market premium exceeds 20 percent. In 
addition, Nicaragua adopted the high external tariffs of the Central 
American Common Market in the period 1966-86. The 1991 dating for 
the reform is based on TIDE, p.36.  
Paraguay Open since 1989. The black market premium averaged 68 percent and 
38 percent in the first and second halves of 1980s, respectively. The 
black market premium was eliminated when the exchange rate was 
unified in 1989. Trade liberalisation also was implemented in 1989. By 
December 1989 the simple average tariff was 16.2 percent (World 
Bank, 1992b, p.54). 
Peru Open 1948-67, followed by closing, and then open since 1991. Thorp 
and Bertram (1978) is the source for the dating of the temporary 
liberalisation episode. It is supported by a low black market premium, 
which was 2 percent during 1960-64 and 8 percent during 1965-69. 
Peru is rated as closed during 1970-90 because of a high black market 
premium. The 1991 date for the recent reform is based on TIDE, p.410.  
Venezuela Open 1950-59, closed 1960-89, open 1989-93, closed since 1993. In 
the 1950s Venezuela was bound by a trade agreement with the United 
States that kept protection low (Allen, 1977, p.92). The lack of 
exchange restrictions during this period is confirmed by the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions. In 1959 a new government 
used the treaty’s escape clause and sharply increased protection (Allen, 
1977, p.92). The dates for the secondary temporary liberalisation are 
based on TIDE, p.530. 
 
Africa:  
Benin Open since 1990. Not rated as open before 1989 because it has a score 
of 4 on its export marketing board (Husain and Faruqee, 1994, p.238). 
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By 1990, Benin’s score was 3, and the discussion in TIDE; p.45, dates 
the start of the reform as 1989. 
Botswana Closed 1966-79, open since 1979. Membership in the Southern African 
Customs Union makes it hard to rate its trade policy as open or closed. 
It is open in relation to the Southern African market, but since the 
countries in the customs union adopt South Africa’s external tariffs, it 
is closed in relation to the rest of the world. In the end, we rated 
Botswana as closed in the 1970s, based on its high black market 
premium data. The date of opening in 1979 is based on the same data. 
Cameroon Open since 1993. Not rated open before 1990 because it has a score of 
4 on its export marketing board (Husain and Faruqee, 1994, p.238). 
The dating of the recent reform is based on TIDE, p.78. 
Gambia, The Reform 1985. Not rated open before 1990 because it has a score of 4 
on its export marketing board (Husain and Faruqee, 1994, p.238). The 
Gambia receives a 2 in 1990, and Husain and Faruqee report virtually 
no administrative controls on foreign exchange allocation. The 1985 
dating is based on the discussion of extensive trade liberalisation 
reforms in TIDE, p.181.  
Ghana Open since 1985. The black market premium fell from 1098 percent 
average (1981-86) to 3 percent (1990), falling below 20 percent in 
1995. In 1990, 0 percent of foreign exchange allocation was controlled, 
and only two items were subject to non-tariff barriers. The World Bank 
rates it as a 4 on its export marketing board in 1990, but the discussion 
in TIDE, p.191, has no mention of this as a constraint on openness. 
Hence we rate Ghana as open from 1985.  
Guinea-Bissau Open since 1987. Not open before 1987 due to a rating of 4 on its 
export marketing board (Husain and Faruqee, 1994, p.238). In 1990 the 
World Bank reports a black market premium of -2 percent and gives 
Guinea a rating of 1 (most liberal) on its export marketing system. The 
1987 dating is based on TIDE, p.205. 
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Kenya Open 1963-67, followed by closing, and then reform in 1993. When it 
became independent in 1963, Kenya entered into a customs union that 
had internal free trade and a common external tariff with Tanzania and 
Uganda. The external tariff was 30 percent for most goods, but 0 
percent for equipment, and 75 percent for luxuries such as cosmetics 
(Barve 1984, p.27). The black market premium averaged less than 20 
percent during the 1960s. Hence Kenya is qualified as open by our 
criteria during this period. The liberalisation ended with Exchange 
Control Act of 1967 and was followed by a gradual increase in 
licensing and tariffs in the 1970s. Since the late 1980s there has been 
extensive trade liberalisation, but the black market premium was higher 
than 20 percent in 1989 and 1990. Source: Husain and Faruqee (1994) 
and the Economist Intelligence Unit, various reports. 
 
Mali Open since 1988. Pursued state-led development between 
independence in 1960, and 1988. State monopolization on exports 
(Husain and Faruqee, 1994, p.238) and extensive import licensing 
(IMF, The Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1965, p.353). 
Scores a 3 on the export marketing index in 1990; TIDE, p. 314, dates 
the reform as starting in 1988.  
Mauritania Open since 1992. Rated closed during 1970-90 because of high black 
market premium, and a 4 on the export monopoly index. TIDE, p. 320, 
states that 1992 marks the decisive intensification of reforms. 
Morocco Open from independence in 1956, to 1964, closed 1946-84, open since 
1984. Imports could be made freely from French franc area countries 
up to 1964 (IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, various 
issues). Introduction of a list permitted imports, and prohibition of 
everything else, in 1964 (IMF, Annual Report on Exchange 
Restrictions, 1965). In 1980, the mean unweighted tariff was 47 
percent (IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1995, p. 33). 
The dating of the 1984 liberalisation is based on Nsouli and others 
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(1995, pp. 32-33). By the mid-1980s the quota coverage, mean tariff, 
and black market premiums were all below our threshold for openness. 
South Africa Open since 1991. Source: Lachman and Bercuson (1992, pp. 32-37). 
South Africa has traditionally followed an import substitution and 
inward looking development strategy. This was reinforced by 
externally imposed trade and financial sanctions in 1985. The United 
States and several other countries began lifting trade sanctions in the 
summer of 1991. Thus although it is hard to put a precise date on 
qualification as open, 1991 seems a reasonable assumption.  
Tunisia Open since 1989. Rated not open in the 1960s because the black 
market premium exceeded 20 percent. The dating of reform is based on 
Nsouli and others (1993, pp. 26-29). Extensive import licensing was in 
place in 1985, covering 82 percent of imports. A five-year trade reform 
program started in 1986, precipitated by the decline in oil prices in 
January 1986. The first stage (1986-88) saw liberalisation of 
intermediates and capital goods; the second stage (1988-91) saw 
further liberalisation of consumer goods. By 1989 the coverage of non-
tariff barriers had fallen below 40 percent for the first time. The black 
market premium data show a small premium (7 percent) starting as 
early as 1975. The IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions 
records no current account restrictions in 1989. 
Uganda Open since 1988. Not rated as open before 1988 because it has a score 
of 4 on its export marketing board (Husain and Faruqee, 1994, p.238). 
The dating of the recent reform is based on TIDE, p.538. 
Zambia Open since 1993. Not rated as open before 1990 because it has a score 
of 4 on its export marketing board (Husain and Faruqee, 1994, p.238). 
The dating of the recent reform is based on TIDE, p.538. 
East Asia:  
Hong Kong Always open. 
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Indonesia Open since 1970. Indonesia had a dual exchange rate system that ended 
April 17, 1970 (Pitt, 1991). The important trade liberalisation measures 
were introduced between May 1966 and July 1967. Import licensing 
was eliminated in October 1966 (Pitt, 1991, p. 181) The median tariff 
rate had fallen below 40 percent by 1970 (Pitt, 1991, table 5.10, p.90, 
which relies on Rosendale, 1981, p. 276). 
Korea, 
Republic of 
Open since 1968. The exchange rate was unified by the mid-1960s. 
The black market premium fell below 20 percent in the period of 1965-
69. A gradual reduction in import tariffs started in the mid-1960s. 
Source: Nam (1989, pp. 165-66). By 1968, the average tariff was 
below 40 percent (Collins and Park, 1989, table 9.12). 
Malaysia Open since independence (1963). The black market premium has never 
exceeded 2 percent. In 1965 the IMF states that “most imports are 
permitted freely under general licenses” (IMF, Annual Report on 
Exchange Restrictions, 1965, p. 347). Malaysia qualifies on all our 
trade indicators and there is no evidence of any major policy changes 
in the 1970s (TIDE, p. 304). 
Philippines Open since 1988. The assessment that the Philippines was not 
sufficiently open in the 1950s is based on data in Intal and Power 
(1990, table 2.4) that the average rate of protection exceeded 40 
percent in the 1960s, and also on Papageorgiou, Michaely and Choksi 
(1991, Vol.2, figure 2.12, p. 24) who rate the 1950s as less open than 
the 1960s. For later periods, we rely on our indicators, and on 
Shepherd and Alburo (1991) and TIDE, p. 414. 
Singapore Open since independence in 1965. 
Thailand Always open. Source: Phongpaichit (1992). 
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APPENDIX 2: DATA SOURCES FOR THE DATA USED IN THE 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL ANALYSES 
 
1. The Growth and Liberalisation Model 
Y: World Bank, World Trade Indicators CD 2001 
EXP: World Bank, World Trade Indicators CD 2001 
POP: World Bank, World Trade Indicators CD 2001 
INV: World Bank, World Trade Indicators CD 2001 
LIB: Sachs and Warner, Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration 
(1995) 
 
2. The Trade Balance and Liberalisation Model 
XM: World Bank, World Trade Indicators CD 2001 
PC: World Bank, World Trade Indicators CD 2001 
TTI: Collected from corresponding country chapters and tables from World Bank, 
World Tables 1995; Trends in Developing Economies 1994, 1995, 1996; World 
Development Indicators 1997; African Development Indicators 1998/99 and World 
Development Report 1998/99  
RER: World Bank, World Trade Indicators CD 2001 
FOOD: World Bank, World Trade Indicators CD 2001 
MAN: World Bank, World Trade Indicators CD 2001 
FUEL: World Bank, World Trade Indicators CD 2001 
ORE: World Bank, World Trade Indicators CD 2001 
LIB: Sachs and Warner, Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration 
(1995) 
 
3. The Model for Inequality 
DGINI: Collected from WIDER, World Income Inequality Database 2000, Deininger 
and Squire, A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality (1996), Bourgignion and 
Morrison, External Trade and Income Distribution (1989) and Global Poverty 
Monitoring Homepage at www.worldbank.org. 
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L/L: World Bank, World Trade Indicators CD 2001 
CII: World Bank, World Trade Indicators CD 2001 
SCH: Barro and Lee, Data Set for a Panel of 138 Countries (1994) and International 
Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications (2000) 
FNO: World Bank, World Trade Indicators CD 2001 
LOP: Defined for each country in the model 
PER: Defined for each country in the model 
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